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Salvaging Democracy for West Papuans in the Face of
Australia-Indonesia Obstruction
Camellia Webb-Gannon
Introduction
This article argues that the democratic ideals
espoused by Australia and Indonesia fall short
in application to West Papua and West
Papuans, and notes that such shortcomings are
legitimated by mainstream media’s exoticist
portrayals of West Papuans, particularly in
Australia. The antidemocratic policies and
processes of each government with regard to
West Papua actually enable the (by and large)
“good” bilateral relations at the state level to
remain intact. However, this article contends
that democracy, as practiced by civil society
actors at the grassroots and digital network
level in Australia and West Papua, creates
cracks in the official Australia-Indonesia state
relationship. Australian concerns over
Indonesian human rights abuses in West Papua
have traditionally been overlooked at the state
level in favor of pursuing an amicable bilateral
relationship.

Map showing West Papua on the island of New
Guinea in relation to Australia and Indonesia.

West Papuans: cannibals or the sacrificed?
Who isn’t fascinated by a cannibal story particularly one about a cannibal act
purportedly planned in the past decade? In
2006, a weekly current affairs television show
hosted by a popular Australian network aired a
program introducing Wawa, a then six-year old
boy its television crew met during a so-called
first contact encounter with West Papua’s
Korowai people. Wawa, the program alleged,
was facing imminent cannibalization by his
tribe for suspicion of witchcraft. A media fiasco
followed in which the television network and its
main rival raced to produce a “rescue Wawa”
story. The rival’s controversial presenter was
deported from West Papua for using a tourist
visa, and Wawa was eventually taken from his
home by the original network’s Sumatran tour
guide to live in Jayapura and, later, Sumatra.

However by forging digital activist networks
locally and internationally—including building
West Papuan-indigenous Australian
partnerships, West Papuans are participating in
a grassroots democratization process with
global outreach, refusing to be sacrificed on
the altar of regional realpolitik. The article
concludes with a cautionary account of an
apparent attempt by an opportunistic
Australian political movement to hijack West
Papuan democratization for its own ends, a
threat West Papuan and Australian civil society
activists are currently moving to contain.

Earlier this year, a staffer of the firstmentioned current affairs program informed
me that a follow up story on Wawa and the
1
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“First contact” tourism and journalism are
sensationalist, essentialist and, with regard to
the Korowai, misleading – European
missionaries have lived with the Korowai since
the 1970s and the Korowai are knowing, if far
from equal, agents in the marketing of their
“culture” to outsiders. The removal of children
from their families of origin by Western
journalists chasing television ratings is of
course ethically highly dubious. Yet, despite the
informed criticism directed towards the current
affairs program after its 2006 West Papua
foray, it has contemplated revisiting the Wawa
story. West Papua has, for a long time,
threatened the stability of the AustraliaIndonesia relationship but Australian citizens
have pressured their government not to let the
Indonesian government escape criticism for the
crimes its military forces commit in West
Papua. In portraying West Papuans as less than
civilized, mainstream Australian media
fabrications such as the “Wawa story” serve to
uphold Indonesia’s ongoing colonial occupation
of West Papua. They also support an Australian
media-military complex—providing a veneer of
justification for Australian training of
Indonesian security forces, 3 —which in turn
“keeps in check” the “violent” peoples of
“Stone Age” Papua. Such portrayals4 feed into
one of two broad narratives that surround
military and government bilateral relations
between Australia and Indonesia in which West
Papua is treated by Australia as either a pawn
or a liability. In the first narrative, that of
“primitive and unpredictable Papuans”, the
Australian public gaze is momentarily averted
from the violence of the Indonesian military in
West Papua, and the pressure on the Australian
government to hold Indonesia accountable is
relieved. The second narrative will be dealt
with in the remainder of this article.

Korowai was being considered. The plan was to
take Wawa on a return visit to Korowai land,
ask him to compare his new school and city life
with that of his village of origin, and assess
how Korowai ways of life, including the
practice of cannibalism, had changed since
2006.
This program concept illustrates the
entrenched ignorance that pervades the
mainstream Australian imaginary of West
Papua and other parts of Melanesia.
Anthropologist Rupert Stasch, the world’s
preeminent scholar on the social relations of
the Korowai, visited Wawa’s people after the
media maelstrom and, through conversation
with those who knew Wawa, found out that
“there was a predictably wide gulf between the
representations that had circulated in the
international media and the boy’s actual history
as understood by his kin and co-villagers (who
1
were unaware of the media coverage)” .
Further, “almost all persons [Stasch] spoke
with said that the exclusive reason the first film
crew’s guide had been approached by villagers
about taking the orphan to town was so that he
would go to school, become literate in
Indonesian, and return as a teacher, nurse, or
government official. These numerous persons
matter-of-factly denied […] suggestions that the
boy had been rumored to be a witch, or had
been in danger of being killed”2.

***
This second narrative presents Indonesia as a
“normal”5 country – that is, democratizing, not
subject to military excesses, and accountable to

Wawa in 2006

2
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West Papuan natural resources, wreaks havoc
on the environment and local communities, yet
7
yields negligible benefits to Papuan people .

the rule of law. The Indonesian government
frequently asserts that these apparent
attributes also extend to its rule in West Papua.
Yet, upon examination, they appear to be
observed more in the breach than otherwise.
The Australian government’s willingness to pay
lip service to Indonesian claims, for the sake of
harmonious relations with Jakarta, silences
West Papuans’ grievances at the official,
bilateral level.
The Australia-Indonesia relationship itself is
often portrayed as one incrementally
strengthening due to Indonesia’s supposedly
increasing democratization. What is rarely
considered, however, is the extent to which
Australian democratic principles are applied to,
and what relationship the democratic
credentials of either government has with, the
political plight of West Papuans. Each of these
concerns has important implications for the
civil societies and governments of both
countries, as well as their bilateral relationship.
Indeed, it appears that it is mutual complicity
in the antidemocratic processes being enacted
in Indonesia and Australia with regard to West
Papua that tends to strengthen the bilateral
relationship at the state level. Simultaneously,
that “good” relationship is threatened by the
alternative processes of digital networking and
grassroots democratization which ignore state
borders and bring civil society in Australia and
West Papua closer together.

Freeport’s Grasberg mine in West Papua. Image
credit: Radio New Zealand International

And the Indonesia military operates with near
impunity in West Papua. In December 2014,
four unarmed West Papuan youth were killed
and 17 more injured in Paniai when the
Indonesian army and police opened fire on a
group of protesters. Although an investigation
into this massacre was opened, it has been
compromised by police involvement. Military
and police violence has also been a mainstay
around Freeport’s mines in Timika since the
company began operations in the 1970s as
security forces vied with each other for
lucrative “protection” contracts for the
company. There is strong evidence suggesting
that security forces also orchestrate violent
conflict around the mine (for example,
ambushes along the road leading to the mine)
and then blame such violence on the guerillaled Free West Papua movement, legitimating
their own presence in the process8.

For example, much has been made of
Indonesia’s democratization since the fall of
Suharto in May 1998, and the implementation
of electoral reforms from 1999 onward.
However, democratic reforms have had a
limited reach in West Papua. For example, in
2003, the province of Papua was divided into
two, “Papua” and “West Papua”, by the central
government, contrary to local wishes and
national law. Local Papuan political parties are
banned 6 . The Freeport mine (see Figure 3),
controlled by an American company that pays
huge royalties and taxes to Jakarta, exploits

High hopes were held for democratic
improvements in West Papua when Joko
Widodo became Indonesia’s president in 2014.
In his most recent visit to the region, Widodo
released five political prisoners and announced
3
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been rolled out in other parts of Indonesia, the
Australian government has legitimated the
charade that those same processes are
reaching West Papua. In fact, Australia has
maintained a “pragmatic complicity” 1 3 in
Indonesia’s treatment of West Papua since
Indonesia invaded the territory in 1962 (shortly
after West Papua’s previous colonizers, the
Dutch East Indies, had made preparations with
West Papuans for an independent West Papua),
and has done little to protest the litany of
human rights crimes committed by the regime.
These include widespread instances of torture
and rape of West Papuans, forced removal from
traditional lands, environmental devastation,
curtailment of civil and political rights,
starvation,
assassinations
and
14
disappearances . Such concerted violence has
stemmed from Indonesian expansionist and
resource exploitation endeavors in West Papua,
attempts to eradicate West Papua’s
independence movement (formed in protest to
Indonesian occupation and fuelled by ongoing
Indonesian violence), and longstanding racism
against West Papuan people.

that the ban on foreign journalists visiting West
Papua would be lifted. However West Papuan
activists claim that the release of the five
prisoners, who were required to ask for
clemency, was tokenistic since some 500 more
protesters were subsequently arrested in May
and June this year 9 . Papua observers in
Indonesia, such as Andreas Harsono of Human
Rights Watch, also doubt the President’s power
to carry out a dramatic reversal to the
longstanding international media blackout on
West Papua kept in place by 18 central
government agencies whose permission is
required to visit the territory and who profit
from their visa vetting role10. Scholar of Papua,
Budi Hernawan, observes that Widodo is
rapidly losing credibility within his own
government. The military is agitating for a
presidential decree to mandate control of
public order by the army and for an
amendment to the law that requires such a
decree in the first place 11 . In other words,
according to Hernawan, the army is working
towards bypassing Presidential checks and
balances in order to once more practice,
unfettered, the fomentation of conflict that
justifies its existence in the far reaches of
Indonesia—particularly West Papua12.

In 1962, when West Papua’s future political
status was under negotiation, Australia’s
external affairs minister Garfield Barwick
asserted that it was not in Australia’s strategic
interest to counter Indonesia’s expansionary
designs on West Papua; Australia would be
better served forging diplomatic ties with a
non-communist Indonesia 15 . The Australian
government therefore supported the USbrokered 1962 New York Agreement that
bequeathed the territory to Jakarta, and the
subsequent rigged 1969 Act of Free Choice that
formalized West Papua’s ongoing annexation by
Indonesia.
Despite the fact that West Papua’s status as
part of Indonesia has been contested ever
since, Canberra's position has been
unwavering. As recently as 2006 Australia and
Indonesia negotiated the Lombok Treaty which
contained a “Papua Clause” committing the

Indonesia’s President Joko Widodo

Australian democracy and West Papua
In recent years, as democratic processes have
4
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The combined efforts of the Indonesian and
Australian governments to whitewash ongoing
brutalities in West Papua are under constant
pressure, however. Moreover, since most
Australian statements regarding relations with
Indonesia are prefaced with references to the
Australian national interest, Indonesia knows
Australian policy on West Papua is strategically
and, at times, legally contingent. Indeed,
precedents exist for Australian support of
human rights and self-determination in
contested Indonesian territories. In addition to
Australia’s about face from support for
Indonesian sovereignty in East Timor in 1999
to rejecting it, Australia also recognized 43
West Papuans who arrived in Australia in 2006
as legitimate asylum seekers and granted them
temporary protection visas, prompting Jakarta
to recall its ambassador from Canberra in
protest.

Australian government to “not in any manner
support or participate in activities by any
person or entity which constitutes a threat to
the stability, sovereignty or territorial integrity
of the other Party, including by those who seek
to use its territory for encouraging or
committing such activities, including
separatism, in the territory of the other
Party”16. Signing this agreement signalled the
Australian government’s willingness to curtail
the democratic freedom of its own citizens to
support persons involved in West Papua’s
independence struggle; this, in order to assure
Indonesia of its unconditional recognition of
Indonesian sovereignty over West Papua.
When Mako Tabuni, a West Papuan
independence activist, was murdered in the
street in Jayapura in 2012, eyewitnesses and,
later, Australian investigative journalists,
asserted that the murder was committed by the
partly Australian funded and trained
Indonesian anti-terror police squad,
Detachment 8817. The following year three West
Papuan men climbed the walls of the Australian
consulate in Bali immediately prior to an
anticipated visit by Australian Prime Minister
Tony Abbott, seeking refuge and calling for the
release of political prisoners in West Papua.
Australian academic Clinton Fernandes, who
was on the telephone to the consulate at the
time of the incident, overheard an Australian
voice threatening to bring in the Indonesian
military and police to remove the Papuan men.
The latter were forced to flee the consulate,
fearful for their lives18.

There have been other hints that Canberra's
continued acquiescence over West Papua has
its limits. After allegations emerged in 2013
that Australia had been spying on Indonesian
officials, and Indonesia responded by
threatening to cease cooperation on managing
“people smuggling”, Abbott reminded Jakarta
that Australia had attempted to dissuade
Australian-based West Papuan activists from
traveling by boat to West Papua, effectively
implying that Australian support for Indonesian
sovereignty over West Papua was tied to
cooperation from Indonesia on issues of
Australian national concern20.
All of this demonstrates that, at a state level,
both Australia and Indonesia are willing to
exaggerate the bona fides of Indonesian
democracy in West Papua and collude to cover
up direct violations of democracy and human
rights in the territory. As a result neither
country is acting altruistically with regard to
West Papua. Indonesia is vested financially in
occupying West Papua, and Australia is vested
financially in appeasing Indonesia and thus
condoning its occupation of West Papua 21 .

In the aftermath of this incident Abbott stated
his desire to convey "in flashing neon lights"
that attempts to “grandstand” against
Indonesia by involving Australia were "not
welcome". Asserting, as Australian leaders
regularly do, that Australia respected
Indonesia’s territorial integrity and
sovereignty, Abbott added, following the lead of
Indonesian leaders, that “the situation in West
Papua was ‘getting better, not worse’”19.
5
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Nevertheless, there is hope that significant
shifts in Australia’s approach to West Papua
might be possible. At present though, it
appears that the strength of AustraliaIndonesia ties in relation to West Papua is in
inverse proportion to the degree of democracy
and human rights respect afforded West
Papuans and their Australian supporters.

Timor)—has emerged over the past two years,
most dynamically in the initiative of the West
26
Papua Freedom Flotilla . This project has
involved two maritime missions, with West
Papuan and Aboriginal activists using
Aboriginal “passports” and West Papuan
“visas” in an effort to carry water from Lake
Eyre to West Papua—a form of nonviolent
direct action highlighting West Papua’s violent
occupation and symbolizing Oceanic indigenous
articulations.

Grassroots democracy and digital networks
By contrast, transformative democratization, in
essence coordinated purposeful action by and
for the affected people, is occurring at
grassroots activist and digital network levels,
linking West Papuan, other Melanesian, and
Australian civil society communities in
solidarity against state-centric oppressive
concepts of sovereignty. This is expressed in a
burgeoning genre of West Papua independence
music being created by West Papuans and their
Melanesian and Australian supporters and
distributed digitally via YouTube, Soundcloud,
iTunes, Bluetooth and SD cards through ever
expanding digital networks22. While evidently
the digital revolution has not impacted all
populations equally, it has had the effect of
spreading music, foundational to Melanesian
cosmology and the life force of West Papua’s
23
independence movement widely and lifting
the regional profile of the West Papuan
struggle. Moreover, social media has also
elevated the perceived urgency of the struggle
in mainstream Australia and internationally,
propelling the circulation of mobile phone
videos such as those depicting the torture of
West Papuans24, and attracting the intervention
of internet activist hacker group Anonymous on
behalf of West Papuans25.

Freedom Flotilla poster featuring West Papuan,
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander flags
(http://freedomflotillawestpapua.org/category/events/
page/2/)

A grass roots activist movement—recognizing a
shared history between indigenous Papuans
and indigenous Australians of settler colonial
violence and cohabitation of the prehistoric
continent Sahul (a Pleistocene era landmass
that included mainland Australia, Tasmania,
New Guinea, Seram and possibly the island of

Two other events are notable with regard to
West Papuan-oriented activism in Australia. In
April 2014 an office opened in Perth to carry
out the work of Oxford-based West Papuan
6
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parliament and met with a favorable tripartisan
reception, further evidence that small
initiatives can reach the halls of power, if not
yet the decision-making chambers.

refugee and independence activist Benny
Wenda and his Free West Papua campaign 27.
Soon after, in June 2014, the author attended
the opening of the Federal Republic of West
Papua’s Department of Foreign Affairs
Immigration and Trade office headed up by
Foreign Minister, Jacob Rumbiak, a former
West Papuan political prisoner living in exile in
Melbourne. The office was located in an
architecturally slick, eco-friendly complex in
Melbourne’s central business district and its
opening was officiated by various local
government officials, indigenous Australian
leaders, and a university representative. Both
of these offices were established in
contravention of the Lombok Treaty and remain
in operation, demonstrating that grassroots,
people-led movements can thrive in the
interstices of top down, anti-democratic power.

Australian academics—some of whom are
affiliated with the West Papua Project at The
University of Sydney—have also been involved
with West Papuan efforts to make their political
presence known in the Melanesian region,
assisting the United Liberation Movement for
West Papua (ULMWP) to develop its latest
submission for membership to the Melanesian
Spearhead Group (MSG). The MSG, a political
bloc comprised of the four Melanesian
countries – Papua New Guinea, Vanuatu, the
Solomon Islands, and Fiji—was formed in 1986,
in part to lobby France for New Caledonian
independence. As such, the indigenous Kanak
independence party, the Kanak and Socialist
National Liberation Front (French: Front de
Libération Nationale Kanak et Socialiste,
FLNKS), has been an integral member of the
MSG from its inception. And West Papua has
for several years sought membership on the
same basis. A limited victory was celebrated in
June 2015 by West Papuans and their
supporters when West Papua was granted
observer status in the MSG, although at the
same meeting Indonesia was granted associate
membership, a higher level, which somewhat
dampened West Papuans’ celebrations.

Supporters of the West Papuan rights
movement in Australia include artists,
academics, people of faith, lawyers and
environmental and indigenous rights activists
who are often loosely aligned with the several
city-based Australia West Papua Associations
and who work in tandem through these
networks. In July 2013, the West Papua Project
at The University of Sydney produced a citizens
tribunal, the first of its kind in Australia,
weighing evidence and hearing testimonies
from survivors of the 1998 Biak Massacre in
which Indonesian security forces murdered up
to 200 West Papuans peacefully demonstrating
on the West Papuan island of Biak28.

These community-initiated activities of West
Papuans in Australia, and of Australians
working in solidarity with them, demonstrate
that steps toward positive change in West
Papua are being pushed from the bottom up
rather than the top down. These actions in
Australia and West Papua suggest possibilities
for a brighter, more democratic future for West
Papuans, in spite of Indonesian and Australian
government efforts to stymie them.

The Indonesian military has never been held
accountable for this massacre, and notable
Australian legal personalities, concerned
academics from institutions across Australia,
and other activists cooperated in an effort to
bring a degree of justice and closure to the
victims even in the absence of a legal remedy.
In March 2015, several of the tribunal team led
by Justice John Dowd and academic Eben
Kirksey presented the evidence brief to Liberal,
Labor and Greens party politicians in federal

Reclaim Australia and the Free West Papua
Party
A sobering phenomenon has recently cast a
7
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shadow over the usually progressive AustraliaWest Papua solidarity movement. A political
party calling itself the Free West Papua Party
29
has been launched from Perth , which appears
to be capitalizing on the Free West Papua
Campaign “brand” created by dynamic West
Papuan activist Benny Wenda. The party
combines anti-Islamic ideology and unrealistic
goals,30 claiming to possess “the potential to
quickly free West Papua through the next
31
Federal Election” . In July 2015 its leader
delivered a speech at an ultra-nationalist
Reclaim Australia rally purporting to support
West Papuan freedom in an era of Islamization.
Campaigning for West Papua at such events
conveys the impression that the fight for the
independence of West Papua is primarily
religious (i.e. a Christian versus Muslim
struggle), which it is not, although at times it
does assume a religio-cultural tone. In fact,
many West Papuans, including some
independence leaders, are Muslim 32 . Both
Australian supporters of West Papuan rights
and West Papuans residing in Australia have
moved quickly to distance themselves from the
Free West Papua Party and its ideological
tenets and implications33.

grievances at the Pacific Islands Forum36, and
the rise of Pacific-wide solidarity for West
37
Papua ) that the West Papuan independence
movement is garnering increasing international
awareness.

Further, indigenous Australians are protesting
34
against the Reclaim Australia movement . If
what Reclaim Australia supporters are really
trying to do is “reclaim” Australia for a majority
“caucasian [sic] and Christian” 35 population
(and those with “assimilationist” aspirations),
then it hardly seems appropriate for an
Australian political party to drag indigenous
West Papuans into the movement. Finally, as
previously mentioned, indigenous West
Papuans and indigenous Australians are
already working together in a dynamic
movement to recognise indigenous sovereignty
in their respective lands with the Freedom
Flotilla initiative. This is an internally
organized, organic movement that represents a
positive reclamation and an indication, among
others (for example the progress made within
the MSG, the tabling of West Papuan

When the Suharto-era general and notorious
strongman Prabowo Subianto was Widodo’s
challenger for the position of Indonesian
president leading up to the last election,
predictions for the status of West Papuans
should his campaign be successful were
“apocalyptic”40. Yet Widodo’s apparent inability
to stand up to pressure from military forces
lobbying to sit above civilian authority may still
have apocalyptic consequences for West
Papuans should the military subsequently be
given freer reign in West Papua. If the result of
increased militarization in West Papua is a
showdown like that of East Timor’s 1991 Santa
Cruz massacre in which 250 protesters were
murdered, international civil society pressure
might occasion a multilateral intervention.
Although the second of these possible futures is
West Papuans’ most immediate hope for

Yet despite this forward momentum, West
Papua is in the grip of a serious demographic
crisis. A history of Indonesian state-sponsored
transmigration and continuous, rapid and
spontaneous migration from other parts of
Indonesia to West Papua, coupled with high
mortality and morbidity rates for West Papuans
38
compared with non-Papuans has meant that
indigenous West Papuans, since 2010, have
become a demographic and cultural minority in
their homeland 39 . Even though many West
Papuans campaign for a referendum on
independence, in statistical terms, if this
becomes an option for them as it did for the
East Timorese in 1999, it is unlikely to deliver
the result hoped for by indigenous
independence-seekers. The future is likely to be
bloody, as West Papuans have demonstrated
since the 1960s that they will not back down,
even in the face of military terror, from their
pursuit of independence.

8
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Conclusion
This article has attempted to demonstrate that
it is important that the Australian public not
take too narrow a view of Australian national
interest – the Australian government has
already made that mistake with regard to West
Papua. Indeed, the Australian government
should remember that what it considers to be
in its best interest can change dramatically and
rather suddenly, as its 1999 intervention into
East Timor revealed. The Australian public
would do well to follow the lead of indigenous
West Papuans and indigenous Australians in
lobbying the Australian government and
demonstrating to mainstream media that
democracy in Indonesia and in Australia should
not be solely for the benefit of privileged
ethnicities and the already rich. Rather,
democracy ought to encompass politico-legal
ethics and processes that facilitate the
meaningful self-determination of each society’s
most vulnerable groups. A healthy relationship
between the two countries—one that valued
democracy in each—would acknowledge both
in law and in practice the traditional custodians
of the various territories comprising the two
countries. It would be committed to fostering
peaceful explorations of self-determination
engaging indigenous peoples as primary actors.
It would consider unacceptable the circulation
of tired, clichéd and frankly dehumanizing
portrayals of West Papuans as cannibals, as
subjects for entertainment on Australian
television. Given the tragedy of Australia’s own
Stolen Generations from indigenous people,
further Australian media interventions in the
life of Wawa, an already traumatised
indigenous child, should certainly be off limits.
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